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Abstract:  
In many professions and personal services, a firm offers a contract with either proportional 
revenue sharing of the worker’s output or a contract with 100% revenue accruing to the worker 
in exchange for a fixed (debt) payment. Contingent on the contract, the worker chooses the 
mechanism to achieve the desired level of productivity. A higher revenue split induces the 
worker to be more productive in output per hour resulting in a higher wage. The relevant price of 
effort is the after-split, after-tax wage controlled for after-tax household income. Incentives 
through a higher split raise productivity and the return to effort. The sample is 1,559 U.S. real 
estate sales professionals paid on contract splits in 2007 and choosing their hours and effort. The 
compensated labor supply elasticity is positive and between approximately zero and 0.3 
suggesting the absence of income targeting for these workers on split and 100% revenue 
contracts. But the inclusion of contractual income split provisions in the model substantially 
increases the labor supply elasticity. 
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Introduction 
The standard neoclassical model assumes that workers are free to set their own hours or that they 
can select a job with an optimal wage-hours combination from a dense distribution of jobs 
(Farber 2005). In recent years, the literature has evolved to examine workers that are free to set 
their own hours such as taxi drivers (Camerer et al. (1997); Chou (2000); Farber (2005, 2008)); 
stadium workers Oettinger (1999) and bicycle messengers Fehr and Goette (2007). The findings 
of these studies are mixed as Camerer et al. (1997); Chou (2000) report negative wage elasticities 
of labor supply while the others generally report low and positive wage labor elasticities. 
While studies of reference-dependent preferences of taxi drivers, stadium vendors and bicycle 
messengers have offered an opportunity to test income targeting, many sales professionals on 
commission represent an important, yet overlooked, segment of workers who set their own 
hours. Commission-based sales professionals, especially those who receive both their share and 
the firm’s share in exchange for a fixed recurring debt payment, represent a broad segment of the 
population. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, the Occupational Outlook 
Handbook states that 517,800 real estate brokers and sales agents were employed in 2008 with a 
projected employment of 592,100 by 2018. Other sales professionals in insurance and financial 
planning, as well as manufacturing sales representatives often have similar exclusive contractual 
arrangements with their host firm. 
The examination of real estate sales professionals adds a several dimensions. The problem of 
transitory demand shocks for taxi drivers as suggested by Camerer et al. (1997) is less likely to 
occur for real estate agents who are able to schedule their work according to the needs of their 
clients. Real estate sales professionals receive a range of commission splits up to a 100% 
contract; the 100% contracts most often occur when the sales professional receives the full 
commission amount (with no split with the firm) in exchange for a fixed debt payment. The 
impact of split has heretofore not been examined, yet it may influence labor supply elasticities 
and the propensity to income target. The survey data on real estate professionals includes 
household income and income from other non-real estate sources which permits an unbiased, 
compensated wage labor supply elasticity missing from most other studies. 
A general model of performance and effort is developed based on contract terms, with workers 
taking into account their household and protected characteristics including race and gender. 
Their return to effort is the after-tax, after-split hourly wage. The model has three stages. In the 
first, the worker and firm negotiate a contract. The contract offers the worker a split of revenue. 
In the limit the contract offers the worker 100% of revenue in exchange for a fixed payment. 
Conditional on the contract the worker selects productivity per hour and a gross wage in the 
second stage. A higher split increases productivity, though this hypothesis is testable. In the third 
stage the worker selects effort or hours worked as the level of input along the productivity 
function. Effort depends on the return to work. A higher split raises the return to work. This test 
comes from whether effort’s logarithmic coefficient in the return to work is positive. Workers 
have flexibility to choose hours, the contract, control and ownership mixes and productivity. 
Controlled for are their protected variables, taxes and household income. 
The sample contains 1,559 salespeople surveyed in 2008 for calendar 2007. Most are sales 
agents and brokers offered a revenue (or commission) split at the beginning of the year. During 
the year they respond with revenue generated and hours worked. Some have a 100% revenue 
contract where the salesperson receives the full revenue generated by the in exchange for a fixed 
debt payment. The impact of a revenue split has heretofore not been examined, yet it is likely to 
influence the labor supply elasticity and possibly even the propensity to income target. This 
study also includes household income and residual (or other) income from other household 
members sources which permits an unbiased, compensated wage labor supply elasticity missing 
from most other studies. 
The findings indicate that agents and brokers are more productive when incentives are increased. 
Those receiving a split between 61% and 70% of gross billings have hourly wages 20% higher 
than in the 51% to 60% group. Each employee’s split is assigned to a decile. Those in the 61% to 
70% group have a wage that increases by 2.1% for each percentage point increase in the split 
compared with those in the 51% to 60% category. The corresponding increases are 2.3%, 1.2% 
and 2.5% as marginal returns for a one percentage point split for those starting in the 71%, 81% 
and 91% categories. All of these employees are receiving splits or a division with the firm. 
The 100% contract is a corner solution. The wage is 21% higher than for an employee receiving 
a split in the adjacent category of 91%–99%. These employees are renting from the employer, 
and constitute 11.5% of the sample. The self-selection term for being one’s own boss is negative 
but not significant, indicating that there are no strong preferences for control. The firm can 
charge up to 21% as the rent for offering the control contract under risk neutrality. 
The return to work is the product of the hourly wage, one minus the tax rate and the split. The 
hourly wage is fitted from the productivity equation and converted to an after-tax basis. 
Household income is on an after-tax basis. Skills and protected variables including race and 
gender are included. 
Controlled for are the contract conditions of the split in categories and whether the employee has 
purchased either debt or equity from the firm. A 1% increase in the return to work increases 
hours worked by between 0.11% and 0.32% depending on the definition of after-tax household 
income. The normalized return to work is the hourly wage multiplied by the split and divided by 
household income. A 1% increase in the normalized return to work raises effort by between 
0.02% and 0.14%. Across all specifications, these estimates are significantly different from zero. 
While women work 3% fewer hours, there are no differences in effort among White, Black, 
Asian or Hispanic employees after controlling for contract conditions and skills. 
Agents and brokers respond positively to incentives. They are more productive when their split 
rises. They work more hours when the return to work is increased. The return to work is the 
product of the wage, taxes and split. Otherwise, the firm could reduce the split with the employee 
raising effort. The firm benefits by having a larger share of more output. That does not occur. 
Additionally, the wage elasticity is significantly higher when including split provisions in the 
model. Without considering split provisions in the model, the elastcity ranges from 0.04 to 0.1, 
or about 1/3 the correct magnitude. Therefore, split provisions appear to cause hours worked to 
respond more effectively to changes in the wage. As anticipated, increasing household or other 
income cause the wage elasticity to substantially decrease. 
Background describes the background and context. The Model develops a model and the three 
stages. Data and Specification describes the data and empirical results are in Empirical 
Results. Implications and Conclusion discusses implications and offers concluding remarks. 
Background 
In professional employment contracts the worker has alternatives for control, ownership and a 
split. In two cases the worker pays the firm. In a control contract the worker makes a fixed 
payment up front in exchange for receiving all revenue generated. All residual revenue goes 
100% to the worker and there is no split. An ownership contract involves the worker buying into 
the firm’s profit. The profit is the fixed payments plus the remaining portions of splits, less 
expenses. A split is offered when the worker declines the control contract. Instead of an up-front 
debt payment, the worker and firm share gross revenue billed. The worker’s holdings include 
either a control debt contract or a split and ownership. 
Control has led to increased output in some cases. Laffont and Matoussi (1995) find that farmers 
receiving a residual claim after paying rent have higher output and effort.1 Self-employed doctors 
are more productive than those who are employees.2 Control contracts attract jacks-of-all trades 
(Lazear (2005)), those previously successful (Gompers et al. (2010)) or favorable unobservable 
attributes (Chiappori and Salanié (2000), Chiappori et al. (2009)). Other reasons for control are 
having interpersonal skills (Hurst and Lusardi (2004)) or not being financially constrained 
(Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)). 
The benefit to 100% ownership is not universal, with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) 
finding that those on these contracts could earn 10% more annually on a stock index fund. This 
discount comes from unreported pecuniary benefits, a desire for being one’s own boss and a 
preference for skewness and tolerance for risk (Hamilton (2000)). In Bitler et al. (2005) 
entrepreneurial contracts increase hours and output. The split depends on skills, to induce 
incentives (Holmström and Milgrom (1994)) and motivate the long-term risk-taking of Knight 
(1921).3 
The general context is how effort responds to the return to work when people have control over 
hours. Oettinger (1999) uses data on stadium vendors allowed to choose whether to work on a 
given day, though not the hours at each game. The wage elasticities of labor supply are positive, 
ranging between 0.5 and 0.7. In Helland and Showalter (2009) physician effort in hours worked 
declines with the severity of state liability rules. 4 
Farber (2005) finds that New York taxi drivers work longer hours when their hourly wage rises. 
Otherwise, drivers will quit early on days it is easy to make money and work longer when fares 
are scarce. In Farber (2008) the results are robust to reference-dependent preferences where there 
is a target level of income. The shifts end before an income target is reached. Fehr and Goette 
(2007) conduct a field experiment on bicycle messengers permitted to set hours. One subsample 
is given a higher commission rate than the other. The labor supply elasticity exceeds one for all 
hours worked, though an increase in days worked is partially offset by a decrease in daily hours. 
Other evidence finds that effort declines when the return to work rises. Camerer et al. (1997) find 
that taxi drivers work fewer hours on higher-wage days. They attribute this finding to fixed daily 
income targets given transitory demand shocks. These shocks come from weather, holidays, day-
of-the week effects and conventions uncorrelated across days. Chou (2000) for taxi drivers in 
Singapore finds similar results. 
Reconciling these conflicting results involves a set of requirements. Workers are able to choose 
their own hours given their after-tax wage and the split in contract. A more complete analysis 
involves the composition of the household to determine the after-tax income. Having a split 
offers another advantage. The split allows a test of whether effort is increasing with incentives. 
The Model 
The worker is in a group, each of whom generates individual revenue to be split with the firm. A 
given worker is offered a split or proportion of generated revenue s(X), 0 < s(X) < 1 based on 
skills X. The alternative is that the firm offers a control contract where s = 1 in exchange for a 
payment κ. The worker chooses between equity from own work and a split less than one, or a 
debt contract. The firm separately offers ownership p as a share of profits. It should be noted, 
however, that an s is determined by the contracting brokerage firm based upon prior sales 
performance, experience and other relevant factors; the agent or broker does not determine the 
level of s when s < 1.5 
The worker responds to s by determining productivity and effort. The worker generates gross 
billed revenue y= wh from a wage w and hours worked h. Total time available to the worker is γ. 
The utility is u(γ−h, s: p, Z). Hours worked h reduce utility and a higher contract split s increases 
it. Utility is shifted by equity ownershipp and personal characteristics Z, X ⊂ Z. Personal 
characteristics include protected variables such as race and gender that affect utility but are not 
permitted to be used in the contract. 
The worker is selecting on two binary decisions. Control with no ownership involves s = 1, p = 0 
with utility u1 (γ−h, s = 1: p = 0, Z). Ownership without control involves s < 1, p > 0 
and u 2 (γ−h, s: p, Z). When neither control nor ownership is desired, the worker has s < 1, p = 0 
with utility u 0 (γ−h, s: p = 0, Z). The worker wanting both control and ownership has s = 1, p > 0 
and u 12 (γ−h, s = 1: p > 0, Z). The worker is making binary choices on whether to pay for debt 
and control and equity or profits. In the no-pay cases the worker takes a split contract with no 
control for s < 1 and no ownership for p = 0. The equity p > 0 is separate from profit-sharing and 
requires a capital contribution. 
The decision d = 1 occurs for the debt contract when the worker has 100% control of revenue. 
The decision to buy equity in the firm involves e = 1. The worker with no payments for debt or 
equity has these indicators as zero. The worker taking on both debt and equity has b = 1. These 
workers want both control of their revenue and ownership of part of the firm’s residual claim. 
Against the reference of having neither, the demand for debt and equity is 
 
The result is a position of a split 0 < s ≤ 1 from gross revenue and a share 0 ≤ p<1 from the firm’s 
net income. The split controls the worker’s performance in gross revenue. In cases where the 
worker chooses not to be at a corner, taking a split less than one and ownership, the contract 
is s > 0, p > 0. The structure (1) allows for the discontinuities of imperfect capital markets for 
funding debt and equity. Preferences for control allow the worker to operate where returns are 
diminishing or even negative at the margin, contrary to conventional production. 
Given this contract decision, the second stage is for the worker to choose the productivity or 
gross wage. The technology shifts with the split s, yielding gross revenue at a unit price of 
output. The gross revenue is f(h, s, X) depending on the split s, hours worked h and 
characteristics for education, experience, and specialization X. The gross revenue is the 
production function for output with a unit price. Production f is increasing, regular, invertible and 
concave in the hours and split h, s. The price of output is normalized at unity. 
Conditional on the split, the worker has an incentive to shift f (h, s, X) upwards. The worker’s 
after-split income is sf (h, s, X). The firm’s return for a split s < 1 is (1-s) f (h, s: X). With full 
control, the employee receives f (h, s = 1, X)-κ and the firm the fixed payment κ. 
The firm’s profit is maximized subject to the worker’s preferences as a constraint. The 
employee’s output is conditional on the ownership share, and the maximization is over the split 
as the decision variable. Corner solutions for those who prefer control have been taken into 
account in (1). Including only those on a split and buying no debt the maximization is 
 
Then (1−s)f(h,s:X)+θ1u0(γ−h,s:0,Z)−u1+θ12u0(γ−h,s:0,Z)−u12(γ−h,1:p>0,Z) is the associated 
condition. The return to not buying either debt or equity is θ 1. The return to equity, conditional 
on not buying debt is θ 12 Maximizing firm profits with respect to the split leads to the first-order 
condition 
 
This optimal split s* that solves (3) enters the second stage. Those who want control over all 
their revenue generated are at s* = 1. The split and profit s*, p are predetermined prior to the 
worker selecting productivity, wage and hours. 
Output f (h, s*: X) depends on effort h. It is shifted upwards by improved incentives s*, and 
skill X, which includes the equity purchased p. Output per unit of effort or productivity 
is g(s∗,X)=fh. In the second stage the worker selects productivity g once the contract is 
determined. Increased incentives with the split induce the person to raise productivity if ∂g∂s>0. 
The third stage occurs within the household. The employee determines the return to work based 
on the productivity selected and the contract split. The employee’s household characteristics set 
the tax rate, leading to the work return 
w∗(s∗,X)=(1−τ)s∗g(s∗,X). (4) 
The work return is the product of three variables. The contract split s* is based on previous track 
record prior to performance. Contingent on that contract, the employee determines productivity. 
The household’s tax rate shifts the return to work. With the contract and productivity 
predetermined, the return to work and income establish the employee’s effort. 
The budget constraint is on income y from all sources and the value of leisure s* g(γ−h) scaled 
by (1−τ). The marginal utility of full income is θ. Full income is the value of leisure s* g(γ−h) 
and cash received y, both measured after tax. Maximization of direct utility subject to the full 
income constraint yields indirect utility as 
v((1−τ)s∗g,(1−τ)y:s∗,Z)=maxhu(γ−h,s∗:Z)+θ(1−τ)(s∗g(γ−h)+y). (5) 
Hours are conditional on the contract terms for split, debt and equity, personal characteristics and 
income. Effort is the negative of the ratio of the utility derivatives in the return to work and after-
tax income. This condition yields 
h∗(w∗,(1−τ)y:s∗,Z)=−∂v(w∗,(1−τ)y:s∗,Z)/∂w∗∂v(w∗,(1−τ)y:s∗,Z)/∂(1−τ)y. (6) 
Those with full control at s = 1 are included, with the conditional adjustment for being their own 
boss. 
For effort h* and the return to work w*, the compensated supply elasticity given the tax rate, 
split, debt, equity and productivity is ∂lnh∗/∂lnw∗=∂lnh∗/∂ln(1−τ)s∗g. Held constant is the after-
tax income of the household. 
The person increases effort in incentives s* when the elasticity is positive. A rise in the income-
compensated, contract structure-adjusted, after-tax wage leads the worker to supply more effort. 
Otherwise, the firm reduces the split and benefits in two ways. The firm retains the higher 
percentage while the employee puts in more effort and generates additional revenue. 
Data and Specification 
The data are from a spring 2008 survey of 72,000 members of the National Association of 
Realtors® (NAR) who are engage in real estate related occupations, including real estate agents 
and brokers in addition to non-commission workers. The survey captures the calendar year 2007. 
Data for sales professionals include the contract terms, decided at the beginning of 2007, and the 
performance in revenue and effort during the year. The contract includes the percentage split 
with the firm including 100% control with the firm as first claimant. Ownership of equity in the 
firm is reported. Performance includes gross and net income in sales revenue, business expenses 
and hours worked per week. Other information includes education, experience, gender, ethnicity 
and metro location. Firm characteristics and household income are also available from the 
survey. 
The respondents report where they work. To control for local market conditions, the empirical 
model includes the change in employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the median 
price of existing single-family houses in 2007 from the National Association of Realtors®. 
Although there are originally 9,977 usable observations in the data set, there are 1,559 sales 
professionals providing complete information on dependent variables for the split and ownership, 
wages, hours worked per week and household income. The contract conditions give a split 
for s and an ownership stake for p. Those on a debt contract have s = 1, making a fixed payment 
to the firm and retaining any overage. The split remains predetermined before the agent chooses 
productivity or effort. 
The system of equations is based on a recursive structure because each of the endogenous 
variables is determined sequentially; ownership and control are estimated first, and then followed 
by wages.6 The bivariate probit includes ownership and control (no split versus a split). The 
second equation is the natural log of wages sample selection regression with sample selection 
parameters for ownership and control from the bivariate probit; coefficients in the sample 
selection equation are corrected for potential sample selection bias. The third equation is the 
natural log of hours equation with wages and income included as explanatory variables. Because 
the system of equations is recursive, identification problems that are most often associated with 
simultaneous equations are eliminated. With the possible exception of the s = 1 contract, the 
other contract variables are exogenous. Agents and brokers always prefer a higher split, but 
brokerage firms determine their split based upon their experience and sales performance in the 
past. The split is reported at the beginning of the year before their performance during the year is 
known. 
The first estimation step is for the decision in favor of 100% control. This decision to take on 
debt d = 1 has determining variable z1=X1β1+ε1>0. The observed characteristics are X 1 with 
coefficients β 1 and error ε 1. Otherwise d = 0 and the agent splits revenue with the firm. The 
agent has ownership equity when e = 1 determined by z2=X2β2+ε2>0. Otherwise e = 0 and the 
agent has no ownership. The structure is bivariate probit with the form 
 
Here Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the errors. The variances are standardized at unity. 
The correlation coefficient between the errors for taking on debt and equity is ρ. When an agent 
both ownership and control the correlation coefficient is positive. 
Recovered from this first step are two inverse Mills ratios m 1 and m 2 with respective 
coefficients λ 1 and λ2. The fitted inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage regression are 
regressors in the productivity or hourly wage equation in the second step. The product λ1m1 is 
the wage premium for having control. The premium for being an owner is λ2m2. 
The debt variables X 1 in the bivariate probit are years of experience, its square and credentials as 
an associate broker. Other skill variables include having a personal website and the separate 
numbers of commercial and residential properties owned. The firm variables include size by 
logarithmic number of agents and whether the entity is an independent non-franchise firm. 
Various income definitions are constructed. One is total household income, the agent’s net 
revenue after the split plus earnings by other members and investment income. Another is 
residual income not earned by the head, earnings by other members plus investment returns. 
Labor contracts prohibit protected variables for race, gender and ethnicity from being used in 
debt X 1. Since portfolio decisions are made by households, protected variables may affect 
buying equity in the firm. These are included in the equity variables X 2. Both sets include the 
skills of the person and size and characteristics of the firm and local market conditions. 
The second stage estimates productivity conditional on the contract. This split is now a regressor 
as part of the contract. Included are the control and ownership premiums λ1 m 1 and λ2 m 2. The 
dependent variable is the gross wage, or split multiplied by productivity or 
The variables X w that determine the gross wage include skills, firm characteristics and the local 
market with parameters β w. The split is divided into a category matrix S with parameter ϕ w . 
The fitted values of the debt and equity corner contracts and their coefficients are δ1wd^+δ2we^. 
The premiums for control and ownership preferences are λ 1 m 1 + λ 2 m 2. The error is ε w . 
The third stage is the estimation of effort conditional on the contract and wage. The fitted 
gross lnw^g. That gross revenue is divided between the firm and employee by the predetermined 
split. The tax rate is τ. The work return is 
 
The first and second stages of the estimation set the split and productivity. The productivity is 
contingent on the split. The employee takes account of other household members in establishing 
the tax rate, leading to the return to work. Together with protected variables, skills and household 
income, the return to work determines effort. 
With hours worked in logarithms, effort is 
 
The fitted return to work w^=(1−τ)sg^has effort elasticity η w . Household after-tax income is 
(1−τ) y with effort elasticity η y . The error is ε h . The lower condition in (10) occurs for the 
normalized return to work w^gy. Variables in X h with parameters β h are skills, firm 
characteristics, local market conditions and protected variables including race, ethnicity and 
gender. The categories of compensation split S have coefficient ϕ h . Fitted impacts on effort of 
owing debt or equity in the firm are δ1hd^ and δ2he^ . If owning debt makes employees work 
harder, then δ1hd^>0. Estimation is for both versions of (10) and various definitions of income. 
The compensated, after-tax, after-split elasticity of effort with respect to return to work is η w . 
If η w  > 0, people who choose their hours respond positively to incentives. A higher split raises 
the return to work. Increasing the return to work leads to increased effort. The elasticity of 
supply η w is for workers controlling their hours and their intensity of work. It is compensated 
for income, taxes, split and ownership, debt, equity, skills and demographics. There is income 
targeting when η w  < 0. A limiting case is when η w  = −1. 
Empirical Results 
Sample statistics are in Table 1. Agents have an average of 14.7 years of experience. Those on a 
debt contract retaining a residual claim constitute 11.5% of the sample. Conventional wisdom is 
that agents receive a 50% split of a frequently-used commission rate of 6% for selling a house. 
The firm retains the remainder. The transaction has two sides for listing and selling. The listing 
agent receives 1.5%. The agent on the selling side receives the other 1.5%. The 50:50 split is not 
the common practice as revealed in Table 1. In the sample 77% of agents receive more than 50% 
of gross commissions generated. Average gross commission income is $69,217. Average 
household income is $128,320 in 2007. Full-time licensees work an average of 45 h a week. 7  
Table 1. Sample statistics 
Variable Description Standard 
Mean Deviation N 
Sch Years of schooling 14.742 1.949 2,624 
Exp Years of real estate brokerage experience 11.352 9.697 2,611 
Exp2 Square of Exp 222.863 334.922 2,611 
Married Marital status (Married = 1) 0.716 0.451 2,624 
Female Gender (Female = 1) 0.569 0.495 2,624 
Black Ethnicity (African-American = 1) 0.026 0.160 2,624 
Hispanic Ethnicity (Hispanic = 1) 0.038 0.191 2,624 
Asian Ethnicity (Asian = 1) 0.024 0.154 2,624 
Seccar Real estate as second career (Second career =1) 0.958 0.200 2,624 
Persweb Broker has a personal webpage for business 
(Personal webpage = 1) 
0.583 0.493 2,624 
Resprop Number of residential investment properties 0.999 2.380 2,620 
Commprop Number of commercial investment properties 0.166 0.656 2,605 
Asscbrok Associate broker status (Associate broker = 1) 0.167 0.373 2,624 
Brkown Broker-owner status (Broker-owner = 1) 0.135 0.342 2,624 
Indnfr Independent non-franchise status (Independent non-
franchise = 1) 
0.456 0.498 2,624 
Indfr Independent franchise status (Independent 
franchise = 1) 
0.394 0.489 2,624 
Lsfsizf Natural log of firm size (Number of sales 
employees) 
3.959 1.821 2,624 
Lmpr07 Natural log of median metro area single-family 
house prices 
5.546 0.493 1,823 
Pchgemp Percent change in employment 1.032 1.415 2,044 
Profshar Profit sharing plan status (Profit sharing plan = 1) 0.037 0.190 2,624 
Sp51_60 Broker commission split is 51%–60% 0.159 0.366 2,624 
Sp61_70 Broker commission split is 61%–70% 0.240 0.427 2,624 
Sp71_80 Broker commission split is 71%–80% 0.150 0.357 2,624 
Sp81_90 Broker commission split is 81%–90% 0.059 0.236 2,624 
Sp91_99 Broker commission split is 91%–99% 0.051 0.221 2,624 
Sp100 Broker commission is 100% (no split) 0.115 0.320 2,624 
Ginct Gross real estate income ($ 000) 69.217 54.209 2,624 
Hinct Gross household income ($ 000) 128.320 101.269 2,624 
Resinct Gross household income from non real estate 
sources ($ 000) 
59.104 87.759 2,624 
Ninct Real estate income net of expenses and taxes ($ 000) 44.080 38.466 2,624 
Nhinct Household income net of expenses and taxes ($ 000) 101.800 174.034 2,553 
Nresint Net household income from non real estate sources 
($ 000) 
32.106 175.103 2,553 
Hrs Hours worked per week 44.909 12.069 2,624 
Gwage Gross hourly wage 30.999 24.125 2,624 
Nwage Net hourly wage 19.835 17.203 2,624 
Lginc Natural log of gross real estate income 10.750 1.018 2,624 
Lhinc Natural log of household income 11.526 0.717 2,624 
Lresinc Natural log of gross household income (from non 
real estate sources) 
8.081 4.900 2,624 
Lninc Natural log of income net of expenses and taxes 10.263 1.022 2,624 
Lnhinc Natural log of household income 10.533 2.883 2,553 
Lnresin Natural log of net household income (from non real 
estate sources) 
6.085 5.328 2,553 
Lhrs Natural log of hours worked per week 3.769 0.268 2,624 
Lgwage Natural log of gross hourly wage 3.069 0.970 2,624 
Lnwage Natural log of net hourly wage (net of expenses and 
taxes) 
2.582 0.989 2,624 
Lwoir Natural log of (gross wage divided by income from 
non-real estate sources) 
-5.012 5.218 2,624 
Lwtir Natural log of (gross wage divided by household 
income) 
−8.457 0.846 2,624 
 
The first stage contract selection results are in Table 2. For the entire model, the log likelihood of 
−1,549 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The correlation coefficient ρ is 0.42, significant 
at the 1% level. Debt and equity holdings are positively correlated. The non-zero correlation 
coefficient and significance on the estimating equation support the bivariate probit specification.  
Table 2. Contract selection: bivariate probit 
Variable (1) (1) (3) 
Entrepreneurship s = 1 Ownership Marginal effects 
Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Direct Indirect Combined Dummy 
Constant −1.3115b −8.140 −0.6437b −2.872 – – – – 
Exp 0.0507b 4.191 0.0660b 5.263 0.0187 −0.0085 0.0102 – 
Exp2 −0.0007a −2.110 −0.0010b −2.883 −0.0003 0.0001 −0.0001 – 
Married 0.1900a 2.372 0.1070 1.269 0.0700 −0.0137 0.0562 0.0550 
Asscbrok −0.0597 −0.644 – – −0.0220 – −0.0220 −0.0217 
Persweb 0.1683a 2.364 – – 0.0620 – 0.0620 0.0614 
Female – – −0.2426b −3.237 – 0.0311 0.0311 0.0309 
Black – – 0.3715 1.616 – −0.0476 −0.0476 −0.0446 
Hispanic – – −0.1917 −0.907 – 0.0246 0.0245 0.0253 
Asian – – 0.5967b 3.300 – −0.0764 −0.0764 −0.0686 
Seccar – – −0.3117 −1.897 – 0.0399 0.0399 0.0379 
Resprop 0.0398b 3.170 0.0297 1.715 0.0147 −0.0038 0.0109 – 
Commprop −0.0368 −0.806 0.2998b 8.812 −0.0136 −0.0384 −0.0519 – 
Indnfr −0.0617 −0.836 0.3734b 4.349 −0.0227 −0.0478 −0.0705 −0.0700 
Lsfsizf −0.1162b −6.027 −0.3083b −13.580 −0.0428 0.0395 −0.0033 – 
Lresinc −0.0224b −3.303 – – −0.0083 – −0.0083 – 
Rho(1,2) 0.42 7.25             
Log Likelihood −1548.96               
N 2,590               
 
The dependent variable is owners with 100% commission. Marginal effects are the partial 
derivatives of E[y1|y2 = 1] with respect to the vector of characteristics. The estimate of 
E[Sp100|Brkown =1] = .287. They are computed at the means of the independent variables. 
Marginal effects for the dummy variables are the combined effects computed using 
E[y1|y2 = 1,d = 1] - E[y1|y2 = 1,d = 0] where d is the dummy variable 
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level, 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
The first block of results is for selecting control with a share of 100%. More experienced people 
have an increased probability of wanting control. One more year of experience has a coefficient 
of 0.05, with a decreasing marginal effect. Other variables increasing the probability of taking a 
100% contract are having a personal website and owning other residential properties. Working at 
a large firm reduces the probability of control. Higher household income reduces this probability. 
The probability of holding equity is increasing in experience. A year more of experience has a 
coefficient of 0.06. Ownership of the firm is increasing for holding commercial properties. Those 
who work at independent, non-franchised firms have an increased probability of owning equity. 
Large firms offer fewer opportunities either to have control over income or obtain ownership. 
Since ownership is a portfolio allocation as opposed to an employment contract, protected 
variables including gender, race and ethnicity are included. Women are less likely to be owners. 
Within the racial and ethnic groups, Asian-Americans are more apt to be owners. 
The third block of results in Table 2 contains the marginal effects for receiving all revenue 
earned contingent on holding ownership. A year of experience leads to a 1.9% direct effect in the 
probability of owning debt in the firm. After the indirect effect of ownership, the incremental 
probability of holding debt is 1%. Salespeople who own residential real estate have a 1% higher 
probability per property of having the 100% control contract. The control probability decreases 
by 0.3% per 1% increase in firm size, and it declines in income. 
Table 3 reports the second-stage productivity equation with the gross hourly wage as the 
dependent variable. This wage is the productivity choice made by the salesperson, contingent on 
the contract. The first column is when no adjustments for debt or equity are included. The second 
column adjusts for debt, the third for equity and the fourth for both. The results focused on are 
for the last column with both included. For those on a split comprising 88.5% of the sample, the 
results are similar across specifications.  
Table 3. Productivity and intensity: gross hourly wage 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Neither Control s = 1 Ownership Both 
Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. 
Constant 0.9117b 3.298 0.8498b 3.055 0.9037b 3.187 0.9008b 3.161 
Exp 0.0680b 9.883 0.0629b 8.103 0.0679b 9.696 0.0648b 8.527 
Exp2 −0.0014b −7.416 −0.0014b −6.963 −0.0014b −7.446 −0.0014b −7.128 
Married 0.1977b 4.247 0.1870b 3.933 0.1974b 4.256 0.1900b 4.027 
Asscbrok 0.0173 0.294 0.0420 0.679 0.0177 0.302 0.0242 0.407 
Indfr 0.0445 0.993 0.0439 0.981 0.0460 0.989 0.0357 0.752 
Lsfsizf 0.0568b 4.647 0.0691b 4.633 0.0581b 3.396 0.0604b 3.505 
Lmpr07 0.1679b 3.940 0.1690b 3.987 0.1677b 3.960 0.1692b 3.968 
Pchgemp 0.0608b 3.762 0.0603b 3.759 0.0607b 3.779 0.0607b 3.752 
Persweb 0.0034 0.078 −0.0184 −0.400 0.0032 0.074 −0.0121 −0.265 
Seccar −0.1371 −1.242 −0.1324 −1.214 −0.1353 −1.220 −0.1415 −1.268 
Resprop 0.0356b 3.501 0.0288b 2.577 0.0354b 3.446 0.0311b 2.804 
Commprop 0.0664a 2.056 0.0737a 2.239 0.0645 1.766 0.0808a 2.107 
Sp51_60 0.2165b 2.959 0.2196b 2.999 0.2164b 2.976 0.2193b 2.995 
Sp61_70 0.4124b 6.502 0.4174b 6.576 0.4129b 6.536 0.4146b 6.517 
Sp71_80 0.6393b 8.861 0.6456b 8.953 0.6395b 8.915 0.6430b 8.891 
Sp81_90 0.7591b 7.832 0.7660b 7.923 0.7595b 7.880 0.7626b 7.852 
Sp91_99 1.0099b 9.215 1.0134b 9.276 1.0106b 9.266 1.0104b 9.206 
Sp100 0.7401b 9.383 1.3341b 3.238 0.7394b 9.408 1.2189b 2.82 
Brkown 0.0513 0.714 0.0338 0.470 0.0750 0.339 −0.0710 −0.301 
Control m1 – – −0.3138 −1.470 – – −0.2401 −1.119 
Ownership m2 – – – – −0.0139 −0.113 0.0150 0.127 
Adjusted R2 0.25   0.25   0.25   0.25   
F-statistic 29.82   28.45   28.31   27.03   
Log Likelihood −1986.50   −1974.88   −1975.93   −1974.78   
N 1,606   1,606   1,606   1,606   
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
While there are no differences on debt and equity investments, employees respond to split 
incentives. The production function shifts upward at each increase in split. For those receiving a 
split between 51% and 60% of gross revenue, the hourly wage is 21.9% higher than the reference 
group receiving 50% or less.8 In the 61% to 70% group, the wage is 41.4% above the reference. 
The marginal return is 19.5%. For representative agents at the midpoint of their groups, the 
increase in split is 10 percentage points. For each percentage point increase in the split the hourly 
wage rises by 1.9%. This is the marginal return to the employee from raising the split. 
The gross hourly wage is 64.3% higher for those with a 71% to 80% split than the reference 
group. The marginal return is 2.3% per percentage point of split as compared with the 61% to 
70% group. For those in the 81% to 90% group the marginal return is 1.2% per split point. The 
marginal return is 2.5% for those in the 91%–99% group. In all categories, the sequential 
marginal returns are 1.9%, 2.3%, 1.2% and 2.5%. They are all positive. Employees increase their 
productivity at each successive increase in the split. 
The debt contract is at 100%. The problem is determining what the reference group is. 
Employees at 100% would not necessarily have a 91% to 99% split if they declined debt. They 
may have a preference for being their own boss despite not being highly productive. In the first 
column with no adjustment, those on a debt contract have a wage 74% higher than the reference 
group at a 50:50 split. The inverse Mills ratio self-selection terms for holding debt and equity are 
not significant. Nor is the preference for being one’s own boss. 
The wage and productivity respond positively to conventional skills. Another year of experience 
increases the wage by 6.8%, with the impact decreasing. The square of experience is negative in 
the wage equation. The wage is at a maximum at 23 years of experience including the quadratic 
term.9 Owning residential or commercial real estate raises the gross hourly wage by 3.6% and 
6.6% respectively per property. A 10% increase in firm size increases productivity by 0.6%. The 
systematic local market for employment growth and level of house prices raise the wage. A 1% 
increase in local employment raises the gross wage by 6%. A 10% increase in the metro median 
house price increases the gross wage by 1.7%. 
Table 4 estimates effort as the third stage of the sequence. Effort is contingent on the contract 
and selection of productivity. The person has control over work hours, given the choice of 
contract and gross wage or productivity in the sequential first and second stages. Endogenous 
wage and income variables in the model include Lnwage, Lnresin, Lhhinc, Lwoir and Lwtir. 
Therefore, a 2SLS model is estimated using instrumental variables.10 The OLS model results are 
shown in the Appendix. The negative wage elasticity estimates using OLS are negative and 
statistically significant; this indicates that the endogeneity problem could have a substantial 
effect.  
Table 4. Effort: logarithm of weekly hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Constant 2.9845c 12.76
2 
3.3788c 20.67
8 
3.7636c 14.47
5 
3.5419c 32.78
0 
4.6498c 15.74
1 
Age 0.0087 1.236 0.0109b 2.285 0.0121b 2.162 0.0145c 3.300 0.0152c 3.200 
Age2 −0.8952
a 
−1.27
4 
−0.0001
b 
−2.44
7 
−0.0001
b 
−2.34
0 
−0.0001a,
b 
−3.39
1 
−0.0002
c 
−3.41
3 
Married −0.0714
b 
−2.34
7 
0.0013 0.049 0.0015 0.060 0.0591b 2.453 0.0423b 2.017 
Female −0.0356 −1.57
1 
−0.0358
b 
−2.25
7 
−0.0365
b 
−1.96
9 
−0.0350b −2.37
8 
−0.0392
b 
−2.49
7 
Black 0.0527 0.807 0.0093 0.223 0.0379 0.745 −0.0152 −0.41
1 
0.0003 0.007 
Hispanic 0.1124 1.728 0.0345 0.822 0.0144 0.321 −0.0091 −0.28
0 
0.0051 0.143 
Asian −0.0692 −1.13 −0.0342 −0.80 −0.0516 −1.06 −0.0291 −0.75 −0.0396 −0.95
1 8 7 0 2 
Seccar 0.0287 0.454 −0.0105 −0.24
3 
0.0022 0.045 0.0066 0.164 −0.0123 −0.29
9 
Resprop −0.0146
* 
−2.41
2 
−0.0069 −1.60
4 
−0.0078 −1.67
7 
−0.0019 −0.51
3 
−0.0052 −1.44
3 
Commpro
p 
−0.0375 −1.83
8 
−0.0145 −0.99
0 
−0.0125 −0.79
9 
−0.0028 −0.25
4 
−0.0021 −0.18
1 
Sp51_60 −0.1954
* 
−2.51
5 
−0.0824 −1.76
5 
−0.0816
* 
−2.09
7 
−0.0998* −2.05
1 
−0.0580 −1.92
0 
Sp61_70 −0.1897 −1.88
1 
−0.0263 −0.45
9 
−0.0309 −0.69
7 
−0.0331 −0.64
2 
−0.0034 −0.10
8 
Sp71_80 −0.2857
* 
−2.19
6 
−0.0688 −0.91
7 
−0.0785 −1.38
9 
−0.0641 −1.10
3 
−0.0304 −0.84
1 
Sp81_90 −0.2901
b 
−2.03
7 
−0.0702 −0.84
7 
−0.1080 −1.55
6 
−0.0523 −0.81
7 
−0.0195 −0.44
0 
Sp91_99 −0.3320
b 
−2.02
4 
−0.0661 −0.70
3 
−0.1001 −1.32
0 
−0.0313 −0.48
6 
−0.0096 −0.19
7 
Sp100 −0.5299
* 
−2.36
5 
−0.1534 −1.17
1 
−0.1477 −1.58
3 
−0.2205 −1.63
4 
−0.0774 −1.38
2 
Brkown 0.2633c 2.918 0.1395b 2.071 0.1209 1.680 0.1974c 3.011 0.1024b 2.248 
Lnwage 0.3198c 2.946 0.1146 1.762 0.2040c 3.680 – – – – 
Lnresin – – −0.0114
b 
−2.40
1 
– – – – – – 
Lnhinc – – – – −0.0676
b 
−2.25
1 
– – – – 
Lwoir – – – – – – 0.0180c 4.058 – – 
Lwtir – – – – – – – – 0.1407c 4.304 
Log Likel. −863.21   −247.42   −499.54   −167.62   −298.55   
N 1,580   1,559   1,559   1,599   1,599   
aMultiply coefficient by 10−4 
bStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
cStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
The wage and income net of incentives are defined in five different ways in Table 4. The first 
column is where the wage is uncompensated for income. As in all specifications in the table, the 
wage is defined as after the split and taxes. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hours 
worked per week. The labor pricing variable is the logarithm of the after-split, after-tax hourly 
wage. The elasticity of labor supply is 0.32 with a t-statistic of 2.9. No income variables are 
included. 
Column (2) includes residual income. This income is received from non-labor sources including 
investments and from other household members on an after-tax basis. The labor supply elasticity 
compensated for this income is 0.11 (1.7) with t-statistics in parentheses. The income elasticity is 
−0.01 (2.4). Total income, including from the worker is in column (3). The compensated labor 
supply elasticity is 0.20 (3.60) with income elasticity −0.07 (2.25). In both cases the estimates 
are significant at the 5% level. Both the wage and income are defined after taxes and split. 
Income is after taxes and includes that from investments or other household members. 
The final two columns report on the normalized return to work divided by total income. In 
column (4) income is residual excluding that of the employee. In column (5) all income is 
included. The specification accommodates homogeneity of degree zero of preferences in prices 
and income. In column (4) the compensated labor supply elasticity in the wage-income ratio is 
0.02 (4.06) excluding income from own work. Including that income in column (5) the elasticity 
is 0.14 (4.30). 
The labor supply elasticities for the five specifications range from 0.02 to 0.32. None are 
negative. All are significantly positive at the 10% level, and four of five at 5%. Farber (2008) 
notes that if there is measurement error in hours, there is an inverse effect on the wage. The 
estimated elasticities are forced downward, but remain non-negative. The estimates are for 
workers who control their own hours and after taxes, income and incentives and splits. They 
adjust for preferences for control and ownership, and demographic characteristics of the 
household. 
Among the other variables using the results from the last column, older people work harder up to 
a point. One year older in age is leads to a 1.5% increase in hours, though that impact is concave. 
Married people work 4.2% more hours and women the same percentage less. Owners work 
10.2% more hours, and there is no difference across race and ethnicity in effort. 
The question of the impact of split contractual provisions is addressed in Table 5. With the 
removal of all split contract dummy variables and without the first step 100% contract probit 
from the first step, re-estimated labor supply elasticity estimates are shown in Table 5. The wage 
elasticity is considerably smaller without the split provisions. In the first block, for example, the 
elasticity would be 0.08 without the provisions, but is actually 0.32. The compensated elasticity 
shown in the next two blocks are only 0.04 and 0.11without the split provisions, but rise to 0.11 
and 0.20 respectively when the split provisions are captured in the model.  
Table 5. Labor supply elasticity without control for split 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-
stat. 
Coef. T-
stat. 
Lnwage 0.0808b 4.109 0.0370 1.333 0.1114 1.074 – – – – 
Lnresin – – −0.0268a −2.093 – – – – – – 
Lnhinc – – – – −0.0276 −0.316 – – – – 
Lwoir – – – – – – 0.0948a 2.438 – – 
Lwtir – – – – – – – – 0.1271b 4.346 
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
Implications and Conclusion 
Relatively few people are able to control their own hours. Similar to taxi drivers and stadium 
workers, sales professionals in real estate brokerage set their own hours, and for those on a 100% 
contract, they have debt contracts requiring fixed periodic payments in exchange for the benefit 
of affiliation with their host contracting real estate firm. That contract governs the decision to 
perform, including on revenue and effort. 
The compensated labor supply elasticities estimated are positive in all cases. None are larger 
than 0.3, though all are larger than zero. At the median estimate of 0.2, a 10% increase in after-
tax, after-split hourly wages increases hours worked by 2%. The sample mean estimate of the 
hours worked per week is 44. The increase is 0.9 h per week. These findings indicate that 
regardless of the controversy regarding negative versus positive wage labor supply elasticities for 
taxi drivers, the labor supply elasticities, compensated and uncompensated, are uniformly 
positive. However, the inclusion of split contractual provisions in the model increases the 
estimated labor supply elasticity. The increase can be sizable from a range of 0.04–0.11 without 
split provisions to 0.12–0.32. Therefore, although there is no evidence of income targeting as all 
estimates of the wage elasticity are positive; real estate agents and brokers respond to contract 
incentives and continue to work as their wage increases, even though higher household income 
may induce them to work fewer hours. 
Appendix 
Table 6. Labor supply elasticity using OLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. Coef. T-stat. 
Lnwage −0.0223c −3.964 −0.0217c −3.893 −0.0211c −3.323 – – – – 
Lnresin – – −0.0095c −9.571 – – – – – – 
Lnhinc – – – – 0.7354a 0.036 – – – – 
Lwoir – – – – – – 0.0072c 6.063 – – 
Lwtir – – – – – – – – −0.0322c −4.951 
aMultiply coefficient by 10−4 
bStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
cStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
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Footnotes 
1 In Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) a fixed rent is a more efficient contract because the tenant is 
providing the effort and is a residual claimant. This condition holds if the professional and firm 
have the same levels of risk aversion. Splits apply when the firm is more able to bear risk or the 
revenue streams are more uncertain. 
2 In Headen (1990) a premium exists for entrepreneur doctors after adjustment for self-selection. 
Offsetting this effect is the scale in back-office billing and built-in referral networks from having 
hospitals owning medical practices. By 2008 more than half the doctors in the United States were 
working at practices owned by hospitals up from fewer than 20% in 2002, even if the front-office 
look remained the same. Rosen (1992) estimates similar structures for lawyers. 
3 In Prendergast (2002) the assignment of incentive contracts depends on the risk of output. 
When output is less risky firms pay on input. When output is more risky, compensation is based 
proportionally on output. For professionals, output is not only individually observed but risky. 
The Holmström (1979) incentive compatibility constraints apply. Laeven and Levine (2008) 
evaluate contract terms. 
4 Helland and Showalter (2009) use data from the Physician Practice Costs and Income Survey. 
A 1% severity increase in liability lowers effort by 0.3%. For doctors over age 55 the reduction 
in effort is 1.2% for a similar severity increase. Allowing the wage to be exogenous in the effort 
equation causes a downward bias in the measured elasticity. Another source of downward bias is 
if the wage is determined by dividing total earnings by hours. Under income targeting drivers are 
working harder when fares are scarce and less when there are more customers. 
5 An example of 100% compensation is the Re/Max franchise where s = 1. Even firms such as 
Re/Max offering s = 1 in exchange for a debt payment will examine a broker’s prior sales 
performance and experience, for example, because the reputation of the franchise is based upon 
the abilities of their brokers. 
6 In a recursive set of equations, the solution to the nth endogenous variable involves only the 
first n equations of the model, and therefore, the endogenous variables on the right-hand side of 
the equation s do not need to be correlated to the error terms. 
7 Part-time workers defined as working less than 20 h per week are eliminated from the sample 
because they often sell properties to a social network of friends and family. The findings are 
largely the same when including part-time workers, but the inclusion of part-time workers 
creates a potential for sample selection bias. Part-time workers with relatively few hours are 
most often less experienced and tend to receive lower splits than full-time workers. 
8 The exact percentage change requires the following transformation: y = e x where x is the 
regression coefficient. For convenience purposes, the estimates will be discussed without the 
transformation 
9 The maximum is determined by solving for Exp in the following 
equation: δGrossWagesδExp=0 
10 This is equivalent to using fitted values for the endogenous variables in the model. 
 
 
